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Abstract: Among all the global and domestic factors including systematic risk 
considered, oil price has the most positive impact and is priced the most in the returns of 
all the six Saudi equity sectors. The World Capital Market as represented by MSCI has 
the least impact on those isolated equity sectors. The beta risk estimates for all these 
sectors, while controlling for the general market, suggest that that higher risk is 
compensated by greater returns. In the “up” and “down” markets, the sectors have 
asymmetric risk exposure, which implies that these sectors (or those who invest in them) 
inhabit an environment that requires serious hedging during the “down” market.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Until recently, The Gulf’s Arab stock markets of oil-rich countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) have been one of the fastest growing 
equity markets in the world. The total market capitalization of these countries has grown  
from about US $132 billion at the end of 2000 to US$ 534 billion at the end of 2004.  The 
Saudi stock market is the largest in the region, accounting for 56% of the six Gulf’s Arab 
markets and forming up one third of Arab countries’ total stock market1.  
The empirical research on these stock market focuses on the general index of the 
individual markets and not on the individual sectors. The research has concentrated on 
three main issues: market efficiency, volatility of index returns and sensitivity to global 
factors particularly the oil price. Butler and Malaikah (1992), an exception, investigate 
the efficiency for Kuwaiti and Saudi individual stocks and find them not to be efficient 
by any measure of efficiency. Hammoudeh & Eleisa (2004) examine the oil sensitivity at 
the aggregate level for five Gulf markets including Saudi Arabia. They find that on a only 
the Saudi market has a bi-directional causal or mutual predictive relationship with daily 
oil price changes.  However, they find that the stock returns of the smaller oil exporters 
Kuwait and Oman have no causal relationships with oil price changes. Malik and 
Hammoudeh (2003) use a multivariate, two-factor GARCH to investigate the conditional 
                                                        
1 The Saudi market capitalization reached about $306 billion at the end of 2004, giving rise to a gain of 
84.9% after yielding 76.3% in 2003 (Al-Shaikh, 2004). At this level, the Saudi capitalization is greater than 
that of Argentine, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Singapore and 
Turkey, among many others. 
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volatility of the Gulf’s individual markets to both the oil price and the US three-month 
Treasury bill interest rate.  Islam (2004) uses a univariate GARCH to examine the 
conditional volatility of market returns in the Oman market. 
Stock market aggregation may mute equity index sensitivities to risk and global 
factors and may hide causal relationships, making stock or sector selections more 
difficult.  Therefore, there is a need to revisit the findings reached at the general index 
level by examining the responsiveness of sectoral index returns.  Based on availability of 
sectoral data, we are only able to examine six equity sectors’ sensitivities to three global 
factors: oil price, the world capital market and US short-term interest rate, and to the 
domestic interest rate. These sensitivities can then be compared to sectors’ own 
systematic risk sensitivities.  In this case, traders and investors in the Saudi market can 
make more informed decisions in terms of sector section and switching when significant 
shocks affect sectoral risk and the domestic and global factors involved The finding 
should shed some light on whether, for example, the industrial sector is more or less 
sensitive to changes in the oil price, inertest rate or systematic risk than the service or the 
banking sector. This study also addresses the issue of which sector(s) perform better 
during the “up” and “down” markets. 
The major finding in this paper is that among all the oil and financial factors, 
whether domestic or global, the oil price has the most positive impact on all the six 
sectors’ returns, particularly on the returns of Electricity, Industry and Cement which all 
are energy-intensive sectors. The beta risk estimates for all the sectors, suggest that that 
higher general market risk is compensated by greater returns. In the “up” and “down” 
markets, all the sectors have asymmetric risk exposure. Accordingly, an increase in risk 
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exposure during a “down” market has significantly more negative impact on the sectoral 
returns than a decrease in this exposure during an “up” market. This finding suggests that 
these sectors inhabit a market that requires serious hedging to deal with the increase in 
risk during the “down” market. It may also imply that companies in these sectors face a 
more competitive environment during the down side and have difficulty passing risk on 
to their customers. The sector that has the least negative risk exposure is Agriculture 
because the shares of the companies in this sector are “defensible” stock, whereas Banks 
have the most negative exposure during the “down” market. The World Capital Market 
has basically no impact on those sectors which have been segmented from the world 
markets by protective government regulations. 
 
2.  Data Description 
  The data set covers the weekly period July 9, 1994–October 14, 2004. The Saudi  
stock market data includes time-series for the Tadawul all-share general index (SAUD,  
thereafter) and six of its sectoral indexes: Industry, Banks, Service, Electricity, 
Agriculture and Cement2. The  global factor data included series for the spot price of 
West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil, the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
index, MSCI-World, and the US short-term T-bill rate. To control for the Saudi domestic 
liquidity, we include the Saudi short-term interest rate. All the variables are expressed in 
log form, except the two interest rate variables. The data also includes generated time 
series for the six sectors’ systematic risk relative to the Saudi aggregate market. These 
risk series are the sectoral betas generated relative to the overall stock market by window-
                                                        
2 We chose these six sectors because of availability of adequate sectoral index data. We only excluded the 
communications sector because its newly created index does not have sufficient data. 
 4
rolling regressions on a two-month basis, as is the case in the literature, for each of the 
sectors while controlling for the global factors  
 The original daily data span the period July 9, 1994–October 14, 2004. Because 
the US capital and oil markets have Saturday and Sunday as the weekend while Saudi 
Arabia has Friday as its weekend, and thus the two groups have only four days a week in 
common, we opted to use weekly data and chose Tuesday as the week day for all the 
variables because it is in the middle of the trading weeks for both sets of the markets3.  
The general stock index Tadawul is an all-share index which is compromised of 
shares of all the companies listed on the Saudi market. There were 73 companies listed in 
this market in 2004, but its capacity exceeds 200 firms4. During the past decade, only 13 
new companies were listed on this market. The country’s major economic powerhouses, 
like Saudi Arabian Airlines , Saudi Telecom and the National Commercial Bank, with 
total assets that are over 70 billion dollars, were not yet fully listed in 2004.  
The Morgan Stanley Capital International index, MSCI-World (MSCI, thereafter) 
is one of the three global factors used in this study. The second global factor is the WTI 
spot price (WTIS) which is the price for contracts delivered at Cushing, Oklahoma centre 
(Hammoudeh and Li, 2004). The short-term interest rates include the US 3-month 
Treasury bill rate (USTB), as the third global factor, and the Saudi 3-month interest rate 
(STB) as a domestic factor.   
The data base also includes two dummy variables to account for structural breaks 
in the sample period: one for the 1997 East Asian financial crisis (D97), and the other for 
                                                        
3 By choosing a middle of the week trading day, we aimed at avoiding the weekend effect bias. In the 
United States, the weekly data is usually selected for Wednesday. 
4 Among the listed companies, the Industrial sector has 26 firms, Banking 9, Agriculture 9, Cement 8, 
Telecommunications 1, Electricity 1, and Service 19 (See Al-Shaikh, 2004). 
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the change in the OPEC oil price regime in 2000 (D00) from single price-targeting to 
price band-targeting5. The first structural break is dated to when Thailand abandoned its 
fixed exchange rate on July 2, 1997 (Hammoudeh and Li, 2004). The South Asian stock 
markets collapsed as a result of this crisis, affecting stock markets in other developing 
countries. The crisis also caused a drop in the demand for oil, culminating in the collapse 
of oil prices in 1998. The second structural break dates back to February 1, 2000 which 
occurred as a result of lifting the oil price from $19 a barrel to the $25 centre of the band.  
Only D00 which also includes the collapse of the oil price in the aftermath of the Asian 
crisis was found to be significant6. 
 
3.  Overview of Market Performance 
The general market returned an average of 13% annualized on the basis of 52-
weeks over the sample period7. The industrial sector averaged an annualized return of 
18.7% leading all the sectors, followed by the electricity (16.1%) and banks. Cement 
yielded the lowest return averaging 8.8% annualized. However, the Saudi market and all 
its sectors generated returns that are significantly higher than the 5.2% yielded by the 
world market as represented by MSCI.  On the other hand, the Saudi market and some of 
its sectors fell short of the 11.4% rerun yielded by the WTI spot price.  
The (unconditional) return volatility as measured by annualized standard 
deviation is 1.154 for the Saudi market8, which is between the MSCI volatility of 1.092 
                                                        
5 For more information on the oil price target zones see Tang and Hammoudeh (2002). 
6 Other structural dummies were tried but found not significant. 
7 This rate of return averaged 33.5% during the period that followed the introduction of the Tadawul 
trading system in October 2001, the repatriation of Saudi funds from the United States as a result of 9/11 
and the drastic increases in oil prices. The table of the descriptive statistics is available upon request. 
8 The Saudi market volatility increased to 1.378 during the period after October 2001. All the individual 
sectors also experienced an increase in volatility during this recent period.  
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and the S&P 500 of 1.222. The oil market has higher return volatility than those stock 
markets, averaging at 2.698 annualized. Interestingly, the Saudi and US T bill rates are 
significantly more volatile than the oil market because they move more closely with the 
business cycles. 
In terms of the generated systematic risk level, the industrial sector has on average 
the highest risk of 57.72 annualized, while the service sector has the lowest (annualized 
5.72). However, in terms of systematic risk volatility, Agriculture has the greatest risk 
standard deviation followed by Electricity, while the service sector still has the lowest 
risk volatility. As of higher moments, all the sectors with the exception of Service and 
Cement are skewed to the right. This means that there is a higher probability for investors 
to get positive returns from Industry, Electrify and Banking than from Service and 
Cement (Harvey and Siddique, 1999).   
 
4.   Empirical Results 
  We use the international arbitrage price theory (APT) to investigate the roles of 
the oil and financial global factors, domestic interest rate and domestic risk on the Saudi 
sectoral returns. We also wish to test whether or not asymmetric sensitivity is present in 
the sector return when the Saudi general market is in an up and down patterns 
In the international APT model, we estimate sector systematic risks (betas) with 
respect to the Saudi market (SAUD) while controlling for the sensitivities of the oil, 
world capital and money markets. The following basic equations capture the individual 




DLYjt = β0ј + γ1j β1jt + γ2jDLWTISt + γ3jDLMSCI + γ4jSTBt +   ejt               (1a) 
DLYjt = β0ј + γ1j β1jt + γ2jDLWTISt + γ3jDLMSCI + γ4jSTBt +  γ5jUSTBt  +   ejt                     (1b)            
 
where DLYj is the weekly return for the sector j’s stock index, DLWTISt is the weekly oil 
price return for the WTI oil spot price, DLMSCIt is the weekly return on the Morgan 
Stanley Capital Market Index, STBt is the Saudi 3-month interest rate and USTBt is the 
US 3-month T bill rate,9 where the data for the risk factor beta (β1j) is generated through 
8-week rolling regression estimation process10. In equations (1), β1јt is the jth sector’s 
unconditional systematic risk which is invariant regardless of the direction of change of 
the Saudi market. 
 However, the beta risk may exhibit different behaviour depending on whether the 
general market is up (down) and the market return is positive (negative). Research has 
demonstrated that the unconditional systematic risk (betas) and returns may not be related 
empirically due to the bias created by the combination of positive and negative returns. 
Pettengil et al (1995) suggest that the general market and risk should be segregated. Thus, 
we examine the relationship between sectoral returns and  risk in the both up and down 
markets for the all the sector while controlling for  oil price changes, the World capital 
market returns and US and domestic interest rates The relationship conditional on the up 
and down markets for each sector is estimated for the following equations: 
 
                                                        
9 The correlation between: DLWTIS and DLMSCI is -0.048; DLWTIS and STB is 0.019; and DLMSCI 
and STB is 0.019. Thus, there is no multicollinearity problem in the STB equations that do not include 
USTB. The correlation is however high between STB and USTB because the Saudi currency is pegged to 
the US dollar. 
10 The rolling betas were generated from the rolling regressions:  
DLYjt = β0ј + β1jDLSAUDt + γ1jDLWTISt + γ2jDLMSCI + γ3jSTBt +   ejt  
 
This regression was also run for 13 weeks (three months) and the results are basically the same. 
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DLYj = γ0j +γ6j*du* βј + γ7j*(1-du)*βј + γ8j*DLWTIS + γ9j*DLMSCI + γ10j*STB +  ej                 (2a)                  
             
DLYj = γ0j +γ6j*du* βј + γ7j*(1-du)*βј + γ8j*DLWTIS + γ9j*DLMSCI + γ10j*STB +  γ11j*USTB +  ej       (2b)       
              
 
where du =1 if the broad market is up (DLSAUD > 0) and du = 0 if this market is down 
(DLSAUD < 0). The expected sign for γ6j is positive and for γ7j is negative. If this is the 
case, then it means that high-beta sectors outperform low-beta sectors when the broad 
market return is positive, and similarly the high-beta sectors incur higher losses when the 
realized broad market return is negative (Tang and Shum, 2003). The Wald test suggests 
that estimated conditional betas in equations (2) are not symmetric between up and down 
markets for all the industry/country returns (test results are available upon request). Thus, 
in the “up” and “down” markets, all the sectors have asymmetric risk exposure. 
Accordingly, an increase in risk exposure during a “down” market has significantly more 
negative impact on the sectoral returns than a decrease in this exposure during an “up” 
market (see Table 1). This finding suggests that these sectors inhabit a market that 
requires serious hedging to deal with the increase in risk during the “down” market. It 
may also imply that companies in these sectors face a more competitive environment 
during the down side and have difficulty passing risk on to their customers. The sector 
that has the least negative risk exposure is Agriculture because the shares of the 
companies in this sector are “defensible” stock, whereas Banks have the most negative 
exposure during the “down” market. 
In terms of sensitivity to the oil price, the sectors can be grouped into three 
categories. The first category includes the sectors that are directly oil-sensitive in the 
general market with ups or downs, namely Banks, Industry, Services and Electricity. 
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Banks and Services are directly impacted by the liquidity created by higher oil prices. 
Industry and Electricity are also directly affected by the oil boom, but they are heavy 
users of petroleum as an input whether as a raw material or as a fuel.  
The second category includes the sectors that are oil-sensitive only when the 
general stock market is divided into up and down markets. This category includes the 
Service sector which is the least sensitive to total and systematic risks. The third category 
includes the sectors that are not directly oil-sensitive, regardless whether market is 
aggregated or divided into up and down markets. This category includes Agriculture and 
Cement. These relatively small sectors are mainly influenced by market risk and 
government loans. 
It is not surprising in this highly segmented stock market which usually flourishes 
on higher oil price that none of the sectors is sensitive to changes in the world capital 
market as represented by MSCI, whether in the aggregate level representation or when 
the market is categorized into the up and down patterns. Moreover, more than 25% of the 
stocks are traded by few hands such as the government and rich families which control 
when to buy and when to sell. But this market is highly sensitive to regional factors 
including security and political uncertainty The banks demonstrate particular sensitivity 
to political and economic events such as collapse of the oil price in 1999 in the aftermath 
of the 1997 Asian crisis, and the change in the oil pricing mechanism in 2000 as shown 
by the effect of the dummy variable D0011. 
In contrast to the US Treasury bill rate, changes in domestic interest rates 
negatively affect most of the sectors. While the interest rate affects the Service sector at 
                                                        
11 OPEC unofficially adopted the oil price band of $22-28 a barrel in February 2001 (see Tang and 
Hammoudeh, 2002) 
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the aggregate and up markets, the impact is greater on Banks and Industry as expected. It 
should be mentioned that the Cement sector is also sensitive to domestic interest rate 
regardless whether the market is aggregated or it moves up or down. This could be 
related to the fact that construction is financed by domestic loans. Only the banking and 
cement sectors are sensitive to US T- bill rate. While it is obvious why Saudi banks are 
sensitive to the US bill rate, it is harder to explain why the cement sector is sensitive to 
this global variable as well.  
The most consistent sector sensitivity is to changes in domestic systematic risks. 
Industry, Electricity and Agriculture are sensitive to changes in the unconditional risk, 
but all the sectors are compensated in higher returns for the conditional risk in both the up 
and down markets. This means that investors require extra compensation for investing in 
the market. Since the sign for the up beta is positive and that for the down beta is 
negative as expected, then it means that sectors with high-beta sensitivity such as 
Industry, Electricity and Cement should outperform low-beta sectors such as Agriculture 
and Banks when the Saudi aggregate market return is positive. Similarly the high-beta 
sectors incur higher losses when this market return is negative, and thus those sectors 
should be avoided in the case of lower oil prices which usually determine the direction of 
the overall economy and the market for Saudi Arabia (Fasano and Iqbal, 2003).  But the 
major result is that the impact of the change in the oil price is much more priced in 
returns by investors and traders than the impacts of both the conditional and 
unconditional systematic risk for all sectors. 
Analyzing the estimates when the sample period is divided into two subperiods, 
dated before and after the end of 2001 which corresponds to the change in the pricing 
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mechanism by OPEC, the sensitivity to systematic risk for the up market has increased 
considerably for Services and Electricity in the second subsample which comes after 
September 11th, and has witnessed the 2003 Iraq war and the record increases in oil price 
after that. On the down side of the market, the systematic risk has increased for all 
sectors, particularly Electricity. Thus the electricity power sector has increased risk 
sensitivity in both the up and down markets. Since all the sectors have asymmetric 
systematic risk exposure,  
 
5. Conclusions 
Traders who are interested in investing in oil-sensitive stocks in Saudi Arabia may 
during high oil prices select stocks of companies operating in high beta sectors such as 
Industry, Electricity and Cement because the oil price is significantly more priced in 
these sectors than the others.  
Since all the sectors have asymmetric systematic risk exposure in the “up” and 
“down” markets, this finding suggests that these sectors inhabit a stock market that 
requires serious hedging in order to deal with the increase in risk during the “down” 
market. It may also imply that companies in these sectors face a more competitive 
environment during the “down” side and have difficulty passing on risk to their 
customers. Traders may select stocks in the Agricultural sector during the down markets, 
because this sector has the least negative risk exposure as the shares of its companies are 
“defensible” stock. On the other hand, they should avoid shares of the Banking sector 
which has the most negative exposure during the “down” market. 
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Trader should also be aware that systematic risk in the Saudi market has increased 
since the end of 2001 which comes on the back of 9/11 and has witnessed the impact of 
the continuing 2003 Iraq war. Risk exposure has increased for Service in the “down” 
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                     Table 1: 
                    Oil and beta Risk Exposures in the Sectoral Risk-Return Relationships  
 




D00 R2 DW 
Banks ¶ (1a) 0.0003   0.0348c 0.0173 -0.0008  n.s. 0.03 2.01 
           ¶ (1b) 8.5E-05   0.0352 c 0.0224 -0.0054b 0.0052 c n.s. 0.03 2.01
              (2a)  0.0077a -0.0184 a 0.0139 -0.0139 -0.307 -0.0057b 0.04 1.90
              (2b)  0.0075 a -0.0184 a 0.0143 -0.0108 -0.0031c 0.0027 -0.0059a 0.04 1.91
Industry         0.044 b   0.0409 c 0.0273 -0.0016 a  n.s. 0.03 1.88 
 0.0046a   0.0415 0.0346 -0.0067 a 0.0058 n.s. 0.04 1.89
  0.0108 a -0.0153 a 0.02951 0.0091 0.0004 n.s. 0.34 2.03
  0.0109 a -0.0151 a 0.0299 0.0129 -0.0023 0.0030 n.s. 0.34 2.03
Service 8.14E-   0.0084b -0.0036 -0.0003 a  n.s. 0.04 2.10 
 0.00057   0.0085 b -0.0032 -0.0008 c 0.0005 n.s. 0.04 2.10
  0.0082 a -0.0121 a 0.0074 b -0.0063 -0.0002 b n.s. 0.19 2.18
  0.0082 a -0.0121 a 0.0074 b -0.0064 -0.0002 -1.26e-5 n.s. 0.19 2.18
Electricity 0.0027 a   0.0697 b 0.0172 -0.0017 c  n.s. 0.02 1.89 
 0.0026a   0.0700 b 0.0213 -0.0046 0.0032 n.s. 0.02 1.89
  0.0102 a -0.0142 a 0.0242 -0.0249 -0.0011 n.s. 0.02 1.89
  0.0102 a -0.0142 a 0.0244 -0.0219 -0.0031 0.0023 n.s. 0.02 1.89
Agriculture 0.0029 a   0.0490 -0.0557 -0.0024 a  n.s. 0.04 2.05 
     0.0029 a   0.0492 -0.0531 -0.0042 0.0021 n.s. 0.04 2.05
  0.0045 a -0.0052 a 0.0414 -0.0628 -0.0020 b n.s 0.07 2.05
  0.0045 a -0.0053 a 0.0416 -0.0612 -0.0032 0.0013 n.s. 0.07 2.05
Cement 0.0004   0.0271 0.0554 -0.0011 b  n.s. 0.02 1.70 
 0.0008   0.0275 0.0625 -0.0062 a 0.0058b n.s 0.03 1.71
  0.0112 a -0.0117 a 0.0086 0.0403 -0.0007 c n.s 0.26 1.72
  0.0114 -0.0112 a 0.0090 0.0446 -0.0036 c 0.0033 n.s. 0.26 1.73
 
Notes: Equations (1a) to (2b) are defined in the text. Superscripts a, b and c represent levels of significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. n.s. means not significant. 
 
 
 
 
